Evaluación de la mejora de la eficiencia del regadío utilizando un modelo de revelación de preferencias by Gutierrez-Martin, C. & Gomez Gomez, C. M.
Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Tecnología Agraria y Alimentaria (INIA)
Available online at www.inia.es/sjar
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5424/sjar/20110904-514-10
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research 2011 9(4), 1009-1020
ISSN: 1695-971-X
eISSN: 2171-9292
Assessing irrigation efficiency improvements by using  
a preference revelation model
C. Gutierrez-Martin1* and C. M. Gomez Gomez2,3
1 Universidad de Córdoba. Dpto Economía, Sociología y Política Agraria. Campus Rabanales. Ctra N-IV, km 396. 
Edificio C5, 3ª Planta. 14014 Córdoba. Spain 
2 Universidad de Alcalá. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Plaza de la Victoria s/n. 
Alcalá de Henares. 28802 Madrid. Spain 
3 IMDEA Water Calle Punto Net, s/n. Alcalá de Henares. Madrid. Spain
Abstract
This paper develops a general preference model to explain farmers’ decisions. Contrary to better known and most 
commonly used simulation models, the one presented in this paper allows to calibrate, simulate and explain farmers’ 
decisions without assuming linear preferences (as in many multi criteria decision models) or unobservable implicit cost 
functions (as in positive mathematical programming models). The model is calibrated for crop decisions in the Genil 
Cabra irrigated area in the Guadalquivir valley (South Spain) as the resulting empirical model is used to study how farm-
ers react by adjusting these decisions when efficiency in the use of water is improved under different scenarios regarding 
water use rights. The main conclusion of the paper is that the potential water savings from enhancing irrigation technique 
(636 m3 ha–1) are overcome by increasing water demand due to higher per drop water productivity when sunflower is 
replaced by maize. For that reason water price increases and/or reduction of water use rights is a necessary condition to 
convert water savings through improved efficiency into lower water use and better conserved water sources.
Additional key words: agricultural policy; mathematical programming; water demand for irrigation.
Resumen
Evaluación de la mejora de la eficiencia del regadío utilizando un modelo de revelación de preferencias
El artículo presenta un modelo de revelación de preferencias que permite explicar las decisiones de cultivo de los 
regantes. Al contrario de los modelos de simulación más conocidos y utilizados, el que se presenta en este trabajo no 
exige asumir preferencias lineales (como en el caso de las técnicas multicriterio) ni acude a funciones inobservables 
de costes implícitos (como en los modelos de programación matemática positiva). El modelo propuesto se calibra para 
la comarca agraria del Genil Cabra en el valle del Guadalquivir (sur de España) y el modelo empírico resultante se 
utiliza para estudiar las reacciones de los agricultores a las mejoras en la técnica de riego bajo distintos contextos de 
derechos de propiedad. La principal conclusión del trabajo es que los ahorros potenciales de agua que se consiguen 
con la mejora técnica del sistema de riego (636 m3 ha–1) son compensados por los aumentos de la demanda derivados 
de la mayor productividad del agua cuando el girasol es sustituido por maíz. Por este motivo, para conseguir una re-
ducción efectiva del uso del agua y, por tanto, una mejora en las fuentes del recurso, es necesario aumentar los precios 
y/o reducir la cantidad de derechos de propiedad. 
Palabras clave adicionales: demanda de agua de riego; política agraria; programación matemática.
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Introduction
As a result of the progressive deterioration of water 
ecosystems and the increasing demand for environmen-
tal quality, the protection and restoration of water re-
sources have become major targets of the European 
water policy. For instance, the Water Framework Direc-
tive (OJ, 2000) aims to achieve a good water status for 
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with limited information has extended the use of 
Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) to simulate 
farmers’ behaviour and to obtain water demands of 
which many are reported, for example, in Heckelei and 
Britz (2005) and in De Frahan et al. (2007). The gen-
eral idea of PMP consist, first, in using information 
contained in dual variables of the calibration constraints 
to bound the solution of the linear profit maximizing 
problem to the observed activity levels1. Once these 
dual variables are identified, they are used to specify a 
non linear objective function such as the production 
cost and guaranteeing that the marginal cost of the 
activities are equal to its price in the observed activity 
levels. This action guarantees that both the profit 
maximization and the cost minimization problems lead 
simultaneously to an optimal solution which exactly 
matches the baseline activity levels (Howitt, 1995; 
Paris and Howitt, 1998)2. 
PMP procedures guarantee full calibration and offer 
other advantages over previous results. The non linear 
cost guarantees smooth simulation results avoiding 
overspecialisation and corner solutions that are tradi-
tional in linear models built with a small number of 
activities and with numerous resource, technical eco-
nomic and policy constraints. Moreover these models 
might be criticised by the way they deal with the pa-
rameter specification problem. There is an infinite set 
of parameters and functions able to lead the model to 
a perfect calibration and each set of parameters and 
functions leads to a different response behaviour to 
changing economic prices and policy constraints. 
So far the construction of water demand simulation 
models is confronted with a trade off between the 
model’s capability to provide numerical results for 
policy evaluation and coherence with basic economic 
principles. Apart from PMP, most of the existing 
simulation models that have been successfully incor-
porated as tools for policy evaluation in many advanced 
countries3 are based on multi-criteria decision methods 
(MCDM) (Romero and Rehman, 1984; Romero et al., 
1987; Berbel, 1989; Berbel et al., 1991; Rehman and 
Romero, 1993; Sumpsi et al., 1993; Berbel and Ro-
dríguez-Ocaña, 1998; Berbel and Gómez-Limón, 2000; 
Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004). In order to obtain 
European surface water and groundwater by 2015 in 
terms of environmental quality and availability of water 
for human uses. Given this new focus, finding those 
policies with the most favourable trade-offs between 
potentially competing objectives has become a prior-
ity. Emphasis on environmental quality contradicts the 
traditional approach of coping with water scarcity by 
means of increasing supply and asks for the articulation 
of water management policies in order to find an ade-
quate balance between the ecological targets and the 
provision of water services for production and con-
sumption activities. Most of the measures available for 
water demand management consist in reducing the 
water services requirements of the different economic 
activities by somehow improving the efficiency with 
which water is used. But the real effectiveness of this 
kind of measures critically depends on how farmers are 
allowed to adapt crop decisions to the new situation 
and on whether they have or not access to the water 
potentially saved. In fact enhancing efficiency means a 
higher per drop productivity and –other things equal– 
a higher demand for water. These water programs are 
now being questioned even when the reduction in water 
use is a precondition for farmers to receive the financial 
support used by the administration to put the program 
into practice. This paper studies whether improved ir-
rigation efficiencies in the Genil Cabra irrigated area 
in the Guadalquivir valley (South Spain) have resulted 
in lower water use or not.
Material and methods
Farmers’ decisions depend on many technical, eco-
nomical, policy and environmental constraints. Addi-
tionally, in the case of water demand these constraints 
vary from place to place, according to land vocation, 
access to water rights, water tariffs and availability of 
irrigation infrastructure, in such a way that a large scale 
or aggregated model might be uninformative about the 
driving forces behind water demand. Nevertheless local 
and low scale models require detailed information and 
their results might not be easy to generalize or aggre-
gate. The need to represent complex decision problems 
1 This linear model consist in maximizing the profit associated to a vector of activity levels (x, represented by surfaces dedicated 
to a set of crops) with prices and unitary costs considered as constant and subject to a set of resource constraints.
2 The dual variables, obtained in the first stage and used to build the non linear objective function in the second, are assumed to 
capture any type of aggregation or model specification bias, any kind of risk attitude or price expectation as well as any lack of data 
or data measurement error (Howit, 1995; Heckelei and Britz, 2005). 
3 A general review of the literature can be found in Dyer et al. (1992) and Hayashi (1999).
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rooted in basic microeconomic theory, which allows to 
reveal farmers’ preferences without assuming linear 
preferences (as in MCDM) or implicit costs functions 
that are not observable (as in PMP). A behaviour model 
obtained this way will allow us not only the obtention 
of simulation results but a clear interpretation of farm-
ers’ responses to changing incentives and resource and 
policy environments.
Farmers decide on crop land surfaces but care about 
expected profits, risk bearing, managing problems and 
other attributes in the decisions they take. We assume 
that the explanation of any decision, consisting in a 
distribution of the available land among the different 
crop options, relies on an underlying utility function 
formed by the many attributes farmers use to assess all 
the alternatives they have given crop prices and costs, 
resource availability and the other relevant economic, 
agronomic and policy constraints. According to that 
we may assume that observed decisions respond to a 
decision problem of the following kind:
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where x ∈ Rn is the decision profile or the crop portfo-
lio, showing one way to distribute the land among 
crops, and each xi measures the share of land devoted 
to the crop i. The set of n crops includes a reservation 
option (xn) consisting in devoting a share xn of the land 
to rain fed agriculture. From the farmer’s perspective 
any particular crop may be considered as an asset with 
a known present cost and an uncertain value in the 
future (as crop yields and prices are not known in ad-
vance). As the available land is taken as given, this 
investment may be represented as a percentage (xi) of 
the available land. 
Farmers have preferences over attributes of the deci-
sion profile:
 ( ( ) )z z x Rm= ∈  [5]
For example, farmers might prefer decisions with high 
expected profits, highly predictable yields and prices and 
relevant policy results, they assume that farmers’ pref-
erences can be represented by a weighted sum of dif-
ferent criteria, such as expected profits, risk and some-
times management issues. The algorithm used to cali-
brate the weights of the attributes in the linear utility 
function (following Romero and Rehman, 1984) has 
proved is effectiveness to reproduce the baseline deci-
sion. Moreover, the assumption that farmers respond 
with linear preferences to changes in the policy, re-
source and economic environment and, similar to PMP, 
the use of a calibration mechanism effective but not 
rooted in explicit economic principles- are nevertheless 
issues prone to discussion.
To find models using a preference representation 
coherent with basic economic principles we need to go 
back two or three decades to Rausser and Yassour 
(1981) and Delforce and Hardaker (1985). These ap-
plied models of farmers’ decisions try to provide a 
clearer intuition of the logic behind farmers’ decisions 
by using standard economic analysis and by implement-
ing a multi-attribute utility function. Moreover the 
difficulties of running proper elicitation procedures 
with detailed data and the programming and optimiza-
tion tools available at that time made these exercises 
difficult to apply because of the details needed to make 
them useful for policy assessment and project analysis4.
One useful insight of MCDM with respect to PMP 
methods is the extensive demonstration on how farmers 
do not simply act as profit maximizing agents and on 
how taking other decision attributes, such as risk aver-
sion and avoidance of management complexities into 
account, provides a better explanation of current deci-
sions. Some versions of MCDM have been developed 
to include risk avoidance explicitly, as in the “target 
MOTAD” (Minimization of Total Absolute Deviation), 
developed by Tauer (1983) and MOTAD (see Watts et 
al., 1984 for a comparison). Others include a risk pre-
mium in the discount factor (e.g. López Baldovín et al., 
2005) or provide an evaluation of farmers’ attitudes 
towards risk by using alternative utility functional forms 
(e.g. Torkamani and Haji-Rahimi, 2001).
The model
In this paper we present a simulation methodology 
able to calibrate observed decisions with a procedure 
4 The model has been programmed and implemented in GAMS (general algebraic modelling system) allowing the use of an extensive 
database for an explicit use of the preference revelation theory.
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not too much managing actions apart from planting and 
harvesting. To accept taking high risk options risk ad-
verse farmers will ask for compensation, for example, 
with higher expected profits, and the same can be said 
about the willingness to accept crop decisions with more 
roundaboutness and demand for management skills.
Finally F(x) represents the space of feasible decision 
profiles, given the resource, policy, economic and bal-
ance constraints. 
Let us assume that we have an observed decision 
profile and we know the whole set of constraints defin-
ing the feasible decision set. Assume also that we can 
measure a set of potentially relevant decisions attributes 
such as, for example, the expected profit, the variance 
of the expected profit, the hired labour demanded, the 
cost of inputs over the total cost and many other things 
that might be relevant in the farmers’ point of view. The 
first problem we need to deal with to reveal farmers 
preferences is to know which among the potentially 
relevant attributes are the relevant to explain the ob-
served decision. Our method to answer this question 
consists in saying that the relevant set of attributes is the 
one to which the observed decision is closest to the at-
tribute possibility frontier. In other words, if farmers care 
only about profits and risk, the observed decision at-
tributes must be very close to the attribute frontier 
formed only by these two attributes and the same can be 
said about any potential set of attributes. In these condi-
tions the answer to the question of which is the relevant 
set of attributes in explaining farmers’ decisions is the 
one that leads the observed decision attributes the clos-
est to the associated attribute efficiency frontier.
The practical mathematical problem consists in look-
ing for the attribute efficiency frontier starting in the 
point determined by the observed decision profile. In 
real situations this efficiency frontier cannot be defined 
analytically with a closed mathematical function and 
the only way to represent it is by numerical methods5. 
One practical solution consists in extending a ray from 
the origin, passing through the observed decision at-
tributes and extending them as far as possible in the 
space of feasible attributes. This way we can measure 
the distance from the observed attributes to the effi-
ciency frontier attributes. We can repeat this procedure 
for any set of potentially relevant attributes and the best 
candidate to reveal farmers’ preferences will be the one 
that was closest to its associated efficiency frontier. 
Formally the following problem must be solved for any 
member of the Power set (P(z) and for its associated 
observed attributes in the Power set (P(zo))6.
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The solution of this set of maximization problems will 
be an application assigning a distance ϕ l ml( , )= 1  …, 2  
to each member of the power set P(z). The relevant set 
of attributes wil be the one with the lower distance to 
the efficiency frontier measured by the parameter 
( – )ϕ 1 . In synthesis the preference eliciting problem 
can be presented as:
 
Min
  τ  lϕ – 1  
[13]
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The solution of this problem gives us the set (τ*) of 
attributes that better explains current farmers’ deci-
sions. Among the many factors that might be of rele-
vance in farmers preferences, this set of attributes is 
the one which takes the observed decision closer to the 
5 For example, in the profit-risk space any point over the efficiency frontier is defined as the minimum possible risk given the 
expected profit, or as the maximum expected profit given the risk of the decision. By solving many limited optimization problems 
we can obtain different points over the frontier but we cannot integrate them into a single function.
6 A power set P(Z) is the set of all the 2m subsets of the set Z and the power set P0(Z) is the set formed by the 2m subsets of the 
numerical set of observed attributes. 
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attribute efficiency frontier. If this calibration procedure 
takes us close enough to the efficiency frontier we can 
obtain the implicit value of all the attributes over the 
efficiency frontier by analyzing how attributes change 
in the surroundings of this reference point, and this 
information is all we need to integrate a utility function 
representing farmers’ preferences7. 
Once a farmer’s decision is shown as close as pos-
sible to the efficiency frontier, the second stage consists 
in obtaining the farmers’ preferences that explain the 
observed decision as a utility maximizing choice. Tak-
ing into account the relevant decision attributes ob-
tained in the calibration stage, the multi-attribute util-
ity function is the one that is able to represent farmers’ 
preferences in such a way that the observed decision 
becomes the optimal choice. 
Using basic economic principles and knowing the 
efficiency frontier in the surroundings of the observed 
decision allows one to integrate such a utility function. 
Rational decisions imply that, in equilibrium, farmers’ 
marginal willingness to pay in order to improve one 
attribute with respect to any other is equal to the mar-
ginal opportunity cost of this attribute with respect to 
the other. In other words, the marginal transformation 
relationship between any pair of attributes over the 
efficiency frontier is equal, in equilibrium, to the mar-
ginal substitution relationship between the same pair 
of attributes over the indifference curve tangent to the 
observed decision.
The calibration model allows us to obtain the relative 
opportunity cost of each of the relevant attributes with 
respect to the others. This opportunity cost is measured 
by the marginal transformation relationship between 
any pair of attributes (βkp). This value can be obtained 
numerically by solving partial optimization problems 
in the proximity of the observed decision (as for ex-
ample, searching by how much expected profits would 
need to be reduced in order to have a 1% less uncer-
tainty or, equivalently, what is the maximum expected 
profit attainable with a slightly lower risk level)8. The 
numerical results of the marginal relationship of trans-
formation of any pair of attributes in a reference point 
over the efficiency frontier (βkp) is the basic information 
to integrate the farmers’ utility function.
Provided farmers act rationally, in equilibrium, the 
value (βkp), representing the relative opportunity cost 
of any attribute in terms of any other, is equal to the 
marginal substitution relationship between the same 
pair of attributes (which represents the farmers’ willing-
ness to pay for marginal improvement of a given at-
tribute in terms of any other). In other words, in equi-
librium, decisions over crop surfaces are such that:
 MTR MSRkp kp= , that is to say:
 βkp p
q
U z
U z
p q l p q=
∂ ∂
∂ ∈ … ≠– , ( , );1  [16]
This information for the reference point over the 
efficiency frontier is enough to integrate a utility func-
tion leading to the observed decision as the optimal 
decision given the existing resource, economic, balance 
and policy constraints. For example, if we assume a 
constant returns of scale Cobb Douglas utility function 
of the kind:
 U z rrl r r r
l
( )τ αα= ∏ =
=
=
∑1 1 1  [17]
the marginal substitution relationship among any pair 
of attributes is: 
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U z
U z
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and the preference revelation problem is the solution 
of the following system:
 –
α
α
βp k
k p
kp
z
z
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α rr
l
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where the numerical values of the attributes (τ) cor-
respond to the point in the efficiency frontier closer to 
the observed decision attributes, the values of βs, rep-
resenting the opportunity cost of any attribute in terms 
of each other, are marginal transformation relationships 
at the same point, and the only unknowns are the pa-
7 The optimal solution of and the reference point in the efficiency frontier provide all the information to measure the calibration 
error in the atributes space.
8 The calibration procedure requires a convex efficiency frontier, meaning, for example, that decisions with higher expected returns 
are associated with higher risk levels. This hypothesis is explicitly tested in the calibration stage of the model by showing that the 
marginal transformation relationship between two positive attributes would need to be positive.
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rameters of the utility function. According to the Wal-
ras’ Law in this system the number of independent 
equations is equal to the number of attributes (condition 
that is guaranteed by the constant returns of the utility 
function represented in the last equation) and the sys-
tem has a unique solution. Once this solution is ob-
tained the model is calibrated in the sense that the 
optimal decision ( )x Rn∗ ∈  and its associated to the 
decision attributes ( ( ) )τ τ∗ ∗= ∈x Rl , is the one that 
leads the observed decision ( )x Ro n∈  and the observed 
decision attributes ( ( ) )τ τo o lx R= ∈  closer to the effi-
ciency frontier. 
The overall preference revelation model provides 
three kinds of calibration errors. 
— The first error is provided by the solution of the 
preference elicitation model and measures the distance 
between the observed attributes and the attribute effi-
ciency frontier. And is obtained from expression [13] as:
 ∈f = ( – )ϕ 1  [21]
— The second calibration error measures the dis-
tance between the observed attributes and the cali-
brated ones and can be measured as:
 ∈τ
τ
=
−



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∗
=
∑1 2 2 1 21l z zr
o
r
r
or
l ( )
 [22]
— The third error measures the relative distance 
between the observed crop pattern and the optimal crop 
profile as follows:
 ∈x k
o
k
k
ok
l
n
x x
x
=
−




∗
=
∑1 2 2 1 21 ( )  [23]
The mean calibration error can then be defined as:
 ∈=
∈ ∈ ∈f x
2 2 22 +
3
+ τ  [24]
The Genil Cabra irrigated area
The study area is located in the Guadalquivir Valley 
in Southern Spain and constitutes part of the Campiña 
Baja in the province of Cordoba. The Genil Cabra ir-
rigation area presents a typical combination of perma-
nent and temporary crops including wheat with the 30% 
of the area, olives (29%), sunflower (16%) cotton and 
garlic (8% each) and other crops.
Formally allotted water-use rights use amount to 
4,000 m3 ha–1, but due to structural water scarcity the 
water received every year falls short behind this figure 
and effective use is in the range between 2,000 and 
3,000 m3 ha–1, and even lower in drought years. This 
water use rights are conceded by the river basin author-
ity which use a set of predetermined rules to decide on 
the amount of water available at the star of the cropping 
season. Water use rights are attached to land ownership 
and are defined on a given amount of water per hectare. 
In the study area all the water used proceed from sur-
face sources is entirely under the control of the water 
authority not presenting the problems associated with 
illegal water abstractions that are common in southern 
Spain. Average irrigation efficiency is estimated to be 
70% in the baseline and the efficiency improvements 
resulting from the application of the existing mod-
ernization plan can increase this figure to 88% mainly 
as a result of installing drip irrigation infrastructure. 
Available data9 make possible to calculate the ben-
efits obtained by farmers along the last six years. 
Moreover these data correspond to a period when 
farmer’s decisions were affected by the existing com-
mon agricultural policy. This policy has now shifted 
from production-based incentives to a new system, were 
a decoupled payment is received irrespectively of the 
current production. This change in agricultural policy 
also means that farmers are now allowed to decide 
freely about what crops to plant, except in the cases 
when payments are conditioned to the maintenance of 
a maximum surface of some specific crops. For this 
study it would have been desirable to have a long pe-
riod of time to observe how farmers would adapt to the 
new agricultural policy but this will only be possible in 
some years from now. In the study the important prices 
increases registered by cereals (a 40% increase in the 
lasts four campaigns), sunflower (55% in the last two 
years) and maize (21% in two years) are also taken into 
consideration. In the opposite side cotton prices has 
been reduced in 70%. This price changes are in part 
attributable to the partial decoupling of the CAP (Com-
mon Agricultural Policy) financial support (where a part 
9 The information sources used to gather the database are fully explained in Maestu et al. (2008) that was originally developed on 
behalf of the Ministry of the Environment as part of the decision support system developed to support the implementation of the 
Water Framework Directive in Spain (op. cit.). The model was implemented in GAMS and the specific programs are available from 
authors upon request. 
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of the subsidy is still coupled to production levels). 
Other marginal crops still conserve production payments 
and the maximum surface is still controlled in accord-
ance. The alternative to irrigation is the rainfed agricul-
ture from which data were also collected.
Data on crop yields and surfaces were obtained from 
the River Basin Authority (Memorias de Riego elabo-
rated by the Confederación Hidrográfica del Gua-
dalquivir). Water requirements were also obtained from 
this publication. Production costs and inputs used in 
the area were obtained from a periodical publication 
from the Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture 
(Análisis de los Sistemas de Producción del Ministe-
rio de Medio Ambiente y Medio Rural y Marino). 
Market prices were obtained from the Ministry of the 
Environment official publications (Anuario de Estadís-
tica Agraria). All prices and costs were translated to 
constant values of 2008 according to the prices per-
ceived for products and paid for inputs as published by 
the Ministry. To calibrate the model only variable costs 
were considered as far as they are the only costs rele-
vant to explain crops decisions in any moment of time. 
The measure of crop profitability is then the gross 
variable margin. Table 1 shows the basic data per crop.
Model constraints include soil and water availabil-
ity, land vocation in the area (only crops previously 
observed in the area are allowed), maximum crop 
surfaces for CAP regulated crops, good agronomic 
practices represented by crop rotations and upper and 
lower bounds to the surface of permanent crops in the 
short run. 
The scenarios
The calibrated model allows running different 
simulations scenarios with respect to water allowances 
in order to assess prospective changes in crop patterns 
(represented by land distributions among crops) and an 
overall water use, resulting from enhancing irrigation 
efficiency to different values from the current 70% to 
a maximum of 88%.
Two general scenarios were considered. In the first 
case it is assumed that farmers are allowed to apply the 
same amount of water as before the change; in this case 
the maximum water volume applied remains constant. 
In the second it is assumed that water allowances are 
reduced by the water authority in order to maintain the 
quantity of the water effectively used by crops; in this 
case applied water volume is reduced in proportion to 
the increase of irrigation efficiency and the maximum 
applied water becomes a decreasing function of irriga-
tion efficiency. Figure 1 presents the water constraint 
used in each scenario10.
10 A third scenario consisting in setting the maximum water supply as equal to the minimum amount required to satisfy current crop 
evapotranspiration with the maximum efficiency in the irrigation system was also considered but results were discarded as they did 
not provide any relevant information to understand actual farmers choices. 
Table 1. Basic data per crop per hectare 
Crop
Surface
(ha)
Price
(€ kg–1)
Yield
(kg ha–1)
Subsidy
(€ ha–1)
Variable cost
(€ ha–1)
Gross variable margin
(€ ha–1)
Water requirements
(m3 ha–1)
Wheat 4,604.0 0.22 3,583 40 611.67 208.53 1,321
Corn 89.7 0.20 13,5667   0 1,660.17 1,002.90 7,483
Dry bean 125.6 0.25 2,950      55.57 453.23 338.16 1,761
Potato 271.1 0.24 28,666   0 2,862.42 4,062.12 2,157
Cotton 1,328.0 0.26 2,992 1,214.41 1,391.90 596.35 4,138
Sunflower 2,416.3 0.40 1,645   0 318.88 333.48 1,387
Lucerne 250.8 0.14 14,333   0 522.07 1,416.88 6,603
Asparagus 73.7 1.79 4,006   0 6,349.44 830.98 2,641
Melon 181.7 0.31 37,500   0 2,800.10 8,759.72 3,962
Garlic 1,222.7 1.19 12,083   0 4,531.80 9,852.02 3,742
Onion 206.3 0.19 48,333   0 1,611.06 7,760.57 3,742
Vine 179.0 0.52 12,210   0 1,771.32 4,638.43 2,201
Olive 4,400.0 0.65 7,614   0 1,480.58 3,490.31 1,959
Rainfed 0.0 0.18 2,409   0 383.78 39.75               0,000
Source: Own calculation from different sources.
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Results
When deciding over what combination of crops to 
plant, within the set of feasible options, farmers might 
prefer those that simultaneously give them the higher 
expected profit with the lower uncertainty and that are 
less demanding in terms of management and dedication. 
From this intuition we can deduce that the potential rel-
evant attributes of the farmers’ utility function are profits, 
risk and management complexity. The first one is easily 
measured by the expected net profit per hectare of each 
crop (taking into account yields, prices and variable 
production costs observed in the past). The same data on 
crop yields and prices allows measuring the risk of any 
crop decision as the standard deviation of the overall 
expected profit. Measuring management complexities is 
more difficult as many empirical indicators are available, 
in the implementation of the model three alternative in-
dicators were tested: the average per hectare demand of 
hired labor of a crop decision, the amount of per hectare 
demand of family labor and the nonlabor operational cost 
(seeds, fertilizers, energy, hired machines, etc.) per hec-
tare. Nevertheless none of these three attributes was 
identified as relevant in farmers’ decisions (as the result-
ing attribute frontier were not convex or its weight in the 
utility function was not higher than zero).
For this example we assume that farmers prefer 
decision with high expected returns that are secure and 
require lower effort levels in terms of total labor, hired 
labor and intermediate the use of intermediate inputs. 
For this reason the following five decision’ attributes 
with the potential to explain current farmers’ decisions 
were considered: 
— Expected profit per hectare. This attributed is 
measured by the above explained gross variable margin 
and formally defined as: 
 z x xi i i1( ) = Σ pi  [25]
— Avoided risk. Taking a crop decision (x) implies 
bearing a certain risk that can be measured by the 
standard deviation of the expected profit per hectare 
(π(x)), as follows:
 σ pi pi( ( )) ( ( ))x x VCV x xT=  [26]
Where VCV (π(x))is the variance covariance matrix 
of the per hectare crop profits. If we obtain σ as the 
risk associated to the crop decision x leading to the 
maximum expected profit, we can define the risk 
avoided by any alternative crop decision x, as: 
 z x x2 ( ) – ( ( ))= σ σ pi  [27]
— Total labor avoided. The first way to measure 
management complexities avoidance is throug the re-
luctance to use too much labor to implement the desired 
decision. The total labor required per hectare for a 
single crop i is measured by Ni. Then the labor used 
per hectare is defined as N x x Ni i i( ) = Σ . The per hectare 
labor required to implement the crop decision leading 
to the maximum expected profit can be defined as N 
and the labor avoided by any crop decision x can be 
defined as: 
 z x N N x3( ) – ( )=  [28]
— Hired labor avoided. Labor includes household 
and hired labor. A potential attribute in the utility 
function is the avoidance of hired labor (H). Similar 
to the previous case we can define H x x Ni i( ) = Σ , as 
the per hectare amount of hired labor required to 
implement a crop decision x. If H  is the per hectare 
hired labor required for the maximum profit decision 
then avoided hired labor of any decision x, it can be 
defined as:
 z x H H x4 ( ) – ( )=  [29]
— Direct cost avoided. Direct costs (D) include all 
the seeds, fertilizers, hired equipment and all other 
intermediate expenditures required to implement a 
particular crop decision x. We define the per hectare 
direct cost of a crop i as Di, and the direct cost of a crop 
decision as: D x x D Di i( ) .= ∑  If  is the direct cost cor-
responding to the maximum expected profit decision, 
the direct cost avoided by implementing the decision 
x, can be defined as:
 z D x D5 = ( ) –  [30]
Figure 1. Maximum water allowance in the two simulation sce-
narios.
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Table 2 shows the results obtained for all the coef-
ficients of the utility function ( ; , )α j j = …1 5  associ-
ated to all the possible subsets of decision attributes. 
Table 2 also shows the above explained four of calibra-
tion errors (see expressions [21] to [24]).
The minimum average calibration error allows ob-
taining the following utility function as the best repre-
sentation of observed crop pattern decisions (see solu-
tion S3 in Table 2). 
U x z z( ) . .= 1
0 981
2
0 019
This implies that farmers are close to expected 
profit maximizers with risk aversion playing a minor 
but positive role in explaining crop decisions. 
Simulation results (see Figure 2a) show that, pro-
vided farmers have access to the same amount of water 
as in the baseline situation, they will use all water avail-
able and enhancing irrigation will not be an effective 
mean to reduce water scarcity or to reduce pressures 
over the water supplying sources. All the benefits for 
the improvement will come from the higher yields 
resulting from increased amounts of the water effec-
tively used by the crops. The main change in the crop 
pattern will be a substitution of sunflower by the more 
water-intensive maize, increasing by 560 m3 ha–1 water 
requirements from 2,172 m3 ha–1 to 2,732 m3 ha–1 and 
increasing too the gross variable margin at a maximum 
of € 60 ha–1 (see Figure 3).
If water allowances are reduced simultaneously with 
the irrigation efficiency improvement, as shown in 
Figure 2b for the scenario 2, farmers will also use all 
the available water, but the effective water will remain 
constant as the total amount of water applied is re-
duced. Crop patterns remain unaltered and the water 
Table 2. Potential parameters in the multiatribute utility function and callibration errors. Data in percentage
Solution α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 ∈f ∈τ ∈x ∈
S1 100.0 6.3 10.6 6.2 4.6
S2 97.6 2.4 3.9 3.0 3.6 2.0
S3 98.1 1.9 3.2 1.7 3.3 1.6
S4 97.1 2.9 4.5 4.1 4.0 2.4
S5 77.7 2.6 19.7 2.9 9.7 8.9 4.5
S6 78.2 2.3 19.5 2.7 8.9 9.2 4.4
S7 77.4 3.1 19.5 3.6 10.3 8.4 4.6
S8 77.4 2.3 20.3 2.4 9.6 9.3 4.5
S9 71.8 3.1 25.1 3.0 11.5 7.7 4.7
S10 72.3 2.9 24.8 3.3 11.1 7.7 4.6
S11 71.5 3.6 24.8 3.4 11.7 7.6 4.8
S12 71.5 2.9 25.6 2.4 11.6 7.9 4.7
S13 90.7 2.1 7.3 5.1 2.8 3.7 2.3
S14 91.3 1.8 7.0 3.3 1.8 3.5 1.7
S15 90.3 2.7 7.0 4.6 4.3 4.2 2.5
S16 90.3 1.8 7.9 7.5 1.9 3.5 2.8
S17 74.2 2.3 18.8 4.7 5.1 9.7 10.4 5.0
S18 74.7 2.2 18.6 4.5 3.8 8.9 9.6 4.6
S19 74.0 2.9 18.6 4.5 3.8 10.3 8.8 4.7
S20 74.0 2.2 19.4 4.5 3.7 9.7 10.1 4.8
S21 74.0 2.2 18.6 5.3 9.2 9.4 14.4 6.5
S22 67.4 2.9 23.5 6.2 4.5 12.0 13.4 6.2
S23 67.9 2.7 23.3 6.1 4.2 11.7 13.4 6.1
S24 67.2 3.4 23.3 6.1 3.6 12.3 13.3 6.2
S25 67.2 2.7 24.0 6.1 3.6 12.2 13.5 6.2
S26 67.2 2.7 23.3 6.7 6.5 11.9 13.4 6.4
S27 24.4 0.7 61.5 12.0 1.3 13.5 17.5 20.6 10.0
S28 24.6 0.7 61.5 11.9 1.2 21.5 17.5 20.6 11.5
S29 24.4 0.9 61.5 11.9 1.2 4.7 17.5 20.6 9.1
S30 24.4 0.7 61.7 11.9 1.2 22.6 17.5 20.6 11.7
S31 24.4 0.7 61.5 12.2 1.2 6.8 17.5 20.6 9.3
S32 24.4 0.7 61.5 11.9 1.5 11.7 17.5 20.6 9.8
Source: Own calculation.
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saved will amount a maximum of 636 m3 ha–1 that will 
not be used anymore in the irrigated area. Gross vari-
able margin will remain unaltered in this case, as shown 
in Figure 3.
Discussion
When deciding about improving the way water is 
used in the economy, public officers and stakeholders 
must make clear what the policy objective to which 
this decision is expected to contribute is. In many situ-
ations, particularly when water is scarce with respect 
to the existing water use rights, enhancing water effi-
ciency might be considered as a necessary condition to 
reduce water abstraction, but –as the Genil Cabra case 
study makes clear– this is not a sufficient condition. 
What is required in this case is a specific policy ori-
ented to transfer the water saved in the agricultural 
sector to the natural system by reducing the amount of 
water farmers are allowed to use. Otherwise, these sav-
ings will be used to increase production and market 
revenue. It is clear that increasing irrigation efficiency 
does not necessarily make more water available for 
other uses. Water availability for other uses can only 
be increased by decreasing consumption (Burt et al., 
1997). The decision to whether enhancing efficiency 
is an instrument for water conservation or alterna-
tively a mean to promote agricultural production and 
income is a policy question that needs to be considered 
and solved in a transparent way in the public arena. 
In addition to that, some other aspects would need 
to be considered in the assessment of how water effi-
ciency improvements might impact over water bodies. 
A most effective use of the water in the agricultural 
sector also means lower returns and lower water avail-
ability. Moreover, although lower irrigation returns 
might reduce water supply, this also reduces pollution 
loads from fertilizers and other agrochemical products 
improving water quality downstream and underground. 
In the case study the maximum amount of water saved 
that can be potentially left in the water sources amounts 
to 636 m3 ha–1. Even assuming that water use rights are 
reduced, the lower returns will also mean that covering 
the existing demands downstream will lead to a further 
degradation and to an increased scarcity in all the water 
sources downstream. Assessing these effects is out of 
the scope of this paper, but some evidence on the im-
portance of assessing irrigation returns can be found 
in Bielsa and Duarte (2000). Evidence collected by 
Playán and Mateos (2006), shows that the shift towards 
more water intensive crops might reduce water re-
sources at a river basin scale but the lower irrigation 
returns might improve environmental quality. All these 
effects would need to be considered in assessing the 
effectiveness and the opportunity cost of improving 
irrigation efficiency as a water management instrument.
Our case study made clear that, whatever the op-
portunity cost of reducing irrigation returns, the status 
of the affected water bodies will be worse in the sce-
nario 1, when water use rights are maintained, that in 
scenario 2, when these rights are reduced. 
The analysis presented in our case study provides 
relevant information to compare different options to 
Figure 2. Water use in a) scenario 1 and b) scenario 2.
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Figure 3. Gross variable margin in the two scenarios.
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reduce water pressures in a cost effectiveness frame-
work. In scenario 1 we show that 560 m3 ha–1 saving is 
associated to an opportunity cost of € 60 ha–1. The 
higher irrigation efficiency thus opens the option to 
save water at a cost of € 0.108 m–3, a figure that can be 
compared with the other options available in the river 
basin to simultaneously reduce water scarcity and im-
prove the status of water bodies. 
Finally sharing the benefits of the higher efficiency 
between water use in agriculture, allowing farmers to 
benefit from a higher water availability, and water 
conservation, leaving more water in nature, might also 
be a condition to reach a mutually beneficial agreement 
between farmers and the water authority in order to 
make possible the implementation of the program. The 
example presented in the paper provides the informa-
tion required to consider the different options available.
Acknowledgements 
Financial support from the European Commission 
Project EPI Water under the Seventh Framework Pro-
gram (GA265213) and from the Ministry of Science 
and Innovation (CGL CGL2009-09770) is acknowl-
edged as well as the useful comments and suggestions 
from two anonymous referees.
References
BERBEL J., 1989. Analysis of protected cropping: an ap-
plication of multiobjective programming techniques to 
Spanish horticulture. Eur Rev Agr Econ 16(2), 203-16.
BERBEL J., GALLEGO J., SAGUES H., 1991. Marketing 
goals vs. business profitability: An interactive multiple 
criteria decision-making approach. Agribusiness 7(6), 
537-549.
BERBEL J., RODRIGUEZ-OCAÑA A., 1998. An MCDM 
approach to production analysis: An application to irri-
gated farms in southern Spain. Eur J Oper Res 107(1), 
108-118.
BERBEL J., GÓMEZ-LIMÓN J.A., 2000. The impact of 
water-pricing policy in Spain: an analysis of three irri-
gated areas. Agr Water Manage 43(2), 219-238.
BIELSA J., DUARTE R., 2000. La eficiencia técnica de 
riego: Análisis de las conexiones y la utilidad de sus di-
versas definiciones. Rev Esp Estud Agrosoc Pesqu 189, 
103-118. [In Spanish].
BURT C.M., CLEMMENS A.J., STRELKOFF T.S., SOLO-
MON K.H., BLIESNER R.D., HARDY L.A., LOWELL 
T.A., EISENHAUER D.E., 1997. Irrigation perfomance 
measures: efficiency and uniformity. J Irrig Drain Eng 
123(6), 423-442.
DE FRAHAN B.H., BUYSSE J., POLOMÉ P., FERNAGUT 
B., HARMIGNIE O., LAUWERS L., VAN HUYLENBR-
OECK G., VAN MEENSEL J., 2007. Positive mathemat-
ical programming for agricultural and environmental 
policy analysis: review and practice. In: Handbook of 
operations research in natural resources (Weintraub A., 
Bjorndal T., Epstein R., Romero C., eds). Springer, Int 
Ser Oper Res Manage Sci. Vol 99, pp. 129-154.
DELFORCE R.J., HARDAKER J.B., 1985. An experiment in 
multi attribute utility theory, Aust J Agr Econ 29(3), 179-198.
DYER J.S., FISHBURN P.C, STEUER R.E., WALLENIUS 
J., ZIONTS S., 1992. Multiple criteria decision making, 
multiattribute utility theory: the next ten years. Manage 
Sci 38(5), 645-654.
GÓMEZ-LIMÓN J.A., RIESGO L., 2004. Water pricing: 
analysis of differential impacts on heterogeneous farmers. 
Water Resour Res 40, W07S05.
HAYASHI K., 1999. Multicriteria analysis for agricultural 
resource management: A critical survey and future per-
spectives. Eur J Oper Res 122, 486-500.
HECKELEI T., BRITZ W., 2005. models based on positive 
mathematical programming: state of the art and futher 
extensions. 89th EAAE Seminar. Parma, Italy, February 
3-5. pp. 48-73.
HOWITT R.E., 1995. Positive mathematical programming. 
Am J Agr Econ 77(2), 329-342.
LÓPEZ BALDOVÍN M.J; GUTIÉRREZ C., BERBEL J., 
2005. Herramienta para el análisis de escenarios de 
política agraria y ambiental en el regadío del Valle del 
Guadalquivir. Rev Esp Estud Agrosoc Pesqu 205, 65-98. 
[In Spanish].
MAESTU J., GÓMEZ C.M., GUTIÉRREZ C, 2008. El agua 
en la economía española: situación y perspectivas. Mi- 
nisterio de Medio Ambiente, Madrid. [In Spanish].
OJ, 2000. Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of October 23 establishing a framework 
for Community action in the field of water policy. Official 
Journal of the European Union L 327, 22.12.2000, pp. 1–73.
PARIS Q., HOWITT R.E., 1998. An analysis of III-posed 
production problems using maximum entropy. Am J Agr 
Econ 80(1), 124-138.
PLAYÁN E., MATEOS L., 2006. Modernization and opti-
mization of irrigation systems to increase water productiv-
ity. Agr Water Manage 80, 100–116.
RAUSSER G.C., YASSOUR J., 1981. Multi attribute utility 
analysis: The case of Filipino rice policy. Am J Agr Econ 
63(4), 484-494.
REHMAN T., ROMERO C., 1993. The application of the 
MCDM paradigm to the management of agricultural sys-
tems: Some basic considerations. Agr Syst 41(3), 239-255.
ROMERO C., REHMAN T., 1984. Goal programming and 
multiple criteria decision-making in farm planning: An 
expository analysis. Am J Agr Econ 35(2), 177-190.
C. Gutierrez-Martin and C. M. Gomez / Span J Agric Res (2011) 9(4), 1009-10201020
ROMERO C., AMADOR F., BARCO A., 1987. Multiple 
objectives in agricultural planning: a compromise pro-
gramming application. Am J Agr Econ 69(1), 78-86.
SUMPSI J.M., AMADOR F., ROMERO C., 1993. A research 
on the Andalusian farmers’objectives: methodological 
aspects and policy implications. VII EAAE Congress, 
Stresa Italy, Vol. D, pp. 53-68.
TAUER L.M., 1983. Target MOTAD. Am J Agr Econ 65(3), 
606-610.
TORKAMANI J., HAJI-RAHIMI M., 2001. Evaluation of 
farmer’s attitudes using alternative utility functional 
forms. J Agr Sci Technol 3, 243-248.
WATTS M.J., HELD L., HELMERS G., 1984. A comparison 
of target-MOTAD to MOTAD. Can J Agr Econ 32, 175-85.
